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Disrupting terrorist activity 
What are the limits to criminal methods of disruption? 
Stuart Macdonald and Lord Carlile1 
Introduction 
The UK’s CONTEST strategy for countering the threat of terrorism emphasises that 
prosecution is the UK’s preferred method of disrupting terrorist activity.2 Whilst this 
prioritisation of prosecution has several benefits – including the fact that imprisonment is more 
protective of national security than other non-criminal methods of disruption and the level of 
censure communicated by conviction for a criminal offence – it should, we suggest, be 
understood as being rooted primarily in the procedural protections and safeguards of the 
criminal law.3 Suspects charged with a criminal offence are tried in open court, they have the 
opportunity to see and respond to the evidence against them, and the burden of proof rests on 
the prosecution, who must prove their allegations beyond reasonable doubt. These features give 
the criminal sanction a unique moral authority and legitimacy that other methods of disruption 
lack. 
In furtherance of this commitment to prosecuting suspected terrorists, the UK has enacted a 
large number of terrorism precursor offences. In this chapter we evaluate this use of the 
criminal sanction and suggest that there is a need for greater legislative restraint. We develop 
this argument, in the next section, by first examining three non-criminal methods of disrupting 
terrorist activity: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs); asset-freezing; 
and proscription. Whilst each of these powers has been found to be necessary, we outline four 
sets of concerns about them that explain why they are regarded as less desirable in principle 
than prosecution. We then turn, in the following section, to terrorism precursor offences. Whilst 
agreeing that terrorism precursor offences are needed for the sake of prevention, we argue that 
the wide range of such offences currently in force in the UK go too far in pursuit of this 
objective. As a result, the same concerns that apply to the non-criminal methods of disruption 
apply also to terrorism precursor offences. We argue that this is counter-productive, for it risks 
undermining the very features of the criminal law that give it its unique moral authority and 
legitimacy. It is self-defeating to create offences in the name of prioritising prosecution if those 
same offences undermine the basis on which prosecution is prioritised in the first place. 
Non-criminal methods of disruption 
In some instances it is not possible to prosecute individuals suspected of involvement in 
terrorism-related activity; sometimes because there is insufficient admissible evidence 
(particularly given the UK’s self-imposed ban on the use of intercept as evidence in criminal 
trials4); sometimes because there are cogent public interest reasons for not disclosing 
incriminating admissible evidence in open court (e.g. to retain the cover and ensure the safety 
of human agents); and, sometimes, because the individual has already been convicted, served 
                                               
1 The authors would like to thank Lowri Davies for her excellent research assistance during the 
production of this chapter. 
2 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Cm 9608, 
The Stationery Office, 2018). 
3 The ‘priority of prosecution’ is discussed further in Stuart Macdonald, ‘Prosecuting Suspected 
Terrorists: Precursor Crimes, Intercept Evidence and the Priority of Security’, in Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister 
(eds), Critical Perspectives on Counter-terrorism (Routledge, 2014). 
4 HM Government, Intercept as Evidence (Cm 8989, The Stationery Office, 2014). 
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his sentence, but is still assessed as posing a threat to national security. In such a situation, 
CONTEST advocates the use of other methods of disruption that sit outside the criminal justice 
process. One of these – deportation – applies only to foreign nationals. In this section we focus 
on three other methods of disruption that apply to domestic and foreign suspected terrorists 
alike: TPIMs; asset-freezing; and proscription. 
Designed to be ‘less intrusive, more clearly and tightly defined and more comparable to 
restrictions imposed under other powers in the civil justice system’,5 TPIMs replaced the 
previous system of Control Orders in December 2011. According to the Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (hereafter ‘TPIMA’), before issuing an individual with a 
TPIM notice the Home Secretary must first apply to the courts for permission to do so.6 The 
permission hearing may take place without the individual concerned being present, without the 
individual having been notified of the application and without the individual having been given 
an opportunity to make representations to the court.7 If permission is granted, a TPIM notice 
may then be issued and a review hearing is prescribed, at which a Special Advocate represents 
the interests of the individual concerned (see discussion below).8 The TPIM notice may contain 
any of the twelve types of measure listed in schedule 1 of the Act that are considered necessary 
to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, such as an 
overnight residence measure, an exclusion and/or movement directions measure and an 
electronic communication device measure.9 Once issued, the TPIM notice lasts for one year, at 
the end of which the Home Secretary may renew it for a second year if the statutory conditions 
are still met.10 At the end of the second year, however, the Home Secretary may only issue a 
fresh TPIM notice if the individual has been, or is involved in new terrorism-related activity.11 
As of November 2017, there were seven TPIM notices in force.12 TPIM notices have been used 
considerably less frequently than Control Orders. In response to the low number of TPIM 
notices in force in 2014 a number of amendments were made to TPIMA by the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 on the recommendation of the then Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation.13 
In UK law different powers exist for the freezing of terrorist assets.14 Of these, the Terrorist 
Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (hereafter ‘TAFA’) is ‘the default option where the unilateral 
freezing of terrorist assets is concerned’.15 This Act – which was enacted in response to the 
judgment of the Supreme Court that the Treasury had acted beyond its powers in seeking to 
provide for asset-freezing by Order16 – implements the UK’s obligations under UN Security 
                                               
5 HM Government, Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and 
Recommendations (Cm 8004, The Stationery Office, 2011) 41. 
6 TPIMA, s 3(5)(a). An exception exists for cases in which the Home Secretary ‘reasonably considers 
that the urgency of the case requires terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed without 
obtaining such permission’ (s 3(5)(b)). 
7 Ibid. s 6(4). 
8 Ibid. s 8(4). 
9 Ibid. s 3(4). The other eight types of measure are: travel measure; financial services measure; property 
measure; association measure; work or studies measure; reporting measure; photography measure; and, 
monitoring measure. 
10 Ibid. s 5(2). 
11 Ibid. s 3. 
12 Grahame Allen and Noel Dempsey, Terrorism in Great Britain: the Statistics (House of Commons 
Library, 2018). 
13 Ss. 16–20; David Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013: Second Report 
of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Preventions and Investigation Measures Act 
2011 (The Stationery Office, 2014). 
14 In addition to the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 are part II of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 and part 5 and schedule 7 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. 
15 David Anderson, First Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (The 
Stationery Office, 2011) para. 2.3. 
16 HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534. 
 Council Resolution 1373. The Act stipulates a set of prohibitions relating to designated persons, 
including: dealing with funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by a designated 
person;17 making funds or financial services available to, or for the benefit of, a designated 
person;18 and making economic resources available to, or for the benefit of, a designated 
person.19 A person is designated either as an automatic consequence of appearing on the EU 
list drawn up pursuant to Regulation 2580/2001 or on the initiative of the Treasury.20 
Designations last for no more than one year, but may be renewed indefinitely as long as the 
conditions for designation continue to be met.21 The Treasury may also make interim 
designations, which last for thirty days or until replaced by a final designation (whichever is 
earlier).22 These powers are, however, ‘lightly used’.23 Indeed, former Independent Reviewer 
David Anderson urged that ‘consideration continues to be given by all concerned to the greater 
use of TAFA 2010 as a way of disrupting persons who cannot be prosecuted but in respect of 
whom financial restrictions are necessary in order to protect the public from terrorism’.24 
Under the Terrorism Act 2000 (hereafter ‘TA 2000’), the Home Secretary may proscribe any 
organisation that is ‘concerned in terrorism’.25 The Act specifies that an organisation is 
concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, 
promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.26 Seeking to clarify 
the last of these expressions, the Court of Appeal has held that an organisation that has 
‘temporarily ceased from terrorist activities for tactical reasons’ may be said to be concerned 
in terrorism, whereas one that has ‘decided to attempt to achieve its aims by other than violent 
means’ may not – even if ‘the possibility exists that it might decide to revert to terrorism in the 
future’.27 If an organisation is concerned in terrorism, the Home Secretary has regard to five 
factors when deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to proscribe: the nature and 
scale of the organisation’s activities; the specific threat it poses to the UK; the specific threat it 
poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the 
need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against 
terrorism.28 Once imposed, proscription lasts indefinitely. A proscribed organisation, or any 
person affected by the organisation’s proscription, may apply to the Home Secretary for the 
organisation to be de-proscribed.29 If unsuccessful, there exists a right of appeal to the 
Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC).30 The role of POAC is to determine 
whether the Home Secretary’s refusal was ‘flawed’, applying the principles of judicial review.31 
The former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation Lord Carlile and David Anderson 
both asserted the importance of these three methods of disruption. TPIMs ‘are a useful tool for 
the protection of the public in the exceptional cases where a credible terrorist threat cannot be 
                                               
17 TAFA s. 11. 
18 Ibid. ss. 12, 13. 
19 Ibid. ss. 14, 15. 
20 Ibid. s. 1. 
21 Ibid. s. 4. 
22 Ibid. s. 8. 
23 David Anderson, Fourth Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (The 
Stationery Office, 2015) para. 6.1. This report states that, as of 30 September 2014, there were a total of 68 
designations and 59 accounts frozen in the UK. The value of the frozen assets was £61,000. 
24 Ibid. para. 3.26. 
25 TA 2000 s. 3(4). 
26 Ibid. 2000 s. 3(5). 
27 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and others [2008] EWCA Civ 
443, [2008] 1 WLR 2341, [38]. 
28 David Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (The Stationery Office, 2012) para. 4.6. 
29 TA 2000, s. 4. 
30 Ibid. 2000, s. 5(2). 
31 Ibid. 2000, s. 5(3). 
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dealt with by prosecution or deportation’.32 Asset-freezing has a ‘deterrent and disruptive 
effect’33 and also fulfils the UK’s international obligations. And, whilst proscription may have 
limited utility in terms of public protection, it is useful in dealing with lower level activity, it 
supports other countries in their counterterrorism efforts and it deters terrorist organisations 
from operating in the UK and disrupts their ability to do so.34 At the same time, however, both 
have also warned against excessive reliance on these exceptional measures. TPIMs are 
‘restrictive measures [which] should be imposed only when unavoidable, and as a last resort’.35 
‘Asset-freezes, particularly when imposed on persons at liberty in the UK, are highly disruptive 
of everyday life; yet the process of judicial challenge, though designed to be as fair as possible, 
may in some cases be cumbersome, slow and imperfect.’36 And proscription impinges upon the 
right of the organisation’s members to freedom of expression and association,37 can cause 
‘collateral damage’ to individuals ‘who are not members of the proscribed organisation, but 
merely of the ethnic community from which the organisation derives its support’ and can be of 
‘propaganda value’ to governments ‘which seek to repress the organisation in question or the 
population that it claims to represent, perhaps by violent and unsavoury means of their own’.38 
There are four sets of concerns about these non-criminal forms of disruption that we wish to 
highlight for the purposes of this chapter. The first regards the preconditions for the exercise 
of each of the three powers. For the Home Secretary to issue a person with a TPIM notice and 
for the Treasury to designate a person for the purposes of TAFA, it must be shown both that 
the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity and that the measure is 
necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from terrorism.39 This 
two-pronged approach – which involves a forward-looking evaluation of necessity as well as a 
backward-looking question of fact – is in keeping with Noorda’s ‘autonomy respecting model’ 
of preventive measures, in that it requires ‘an individualized and fact-specific assessment of 
risk’ (as opposed to her ‘security protecting model’, which imposes preventive constraints ‘on 
a category of persons defined by certain characteristics, premised on the probability that a 
member of this category will behave in a certain way irrespective of individual risk 
assessments’).40 By contrast, the sole requirement for an organisation to be proscribed is that it 
is concerned in terrorism.41 This leaves the Home Secretary with an ‘extraordinarily wide 
discretion’,42 particularly given the breadth of the statutory definition of terrorism.43 Yet the 
possibility of introducing a necessity test, similar to the one used for TPIMs and asset freezes, 
has not been accepted.44 
                                               
32 David Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2014: Third Report of the 
Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (The 
Stationery Office, 2015) para. 2.12. 
33 Anderson, First Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010,  para. 2.11. 
34 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006 (The Stationery Office, 2009) para. 51; Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011, para. 4.48. 
35 Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2014 (n 32) para 2.12. 
36 Anderson, Fourth Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, para. 3.13. 
37 European Convention on Human Rights, Arts 10, 11. 
38 Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011, para. 4.42. See also Lee Jarvis and Tim Legrand, ‘Legislating 
for Otherness: Proscription Powers and Parliamentary Discourse’ (2016) 42 Review of International Studies 
558. 
39 TPIMA, ss. 3(1), 3(3); TAFA, ss. 2(1)(a), 2(1)(b). 
40 Hadassa Noorda, ‘Preventive Deprivations of Liberty: Asset Freezes and Travel Bans’ (2015) 9 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 521, 524–25. 
41 TA 2000, s. 3(4). 
42 Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011, para. 4.4. 
43 TA 2000, s. 1. The breadth of the existing definition was criticised by the Supreme Court in R v Gul 
[2013] UKSC 64, [2014] AC 1260. 
44 HM Government, The Government Response to the Annual Report on the Operation of the Terrorism 
Acts in 2011 by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (Cm 8494, The Stationery Office, 2013). 
 In addition to the preconditions themselves, the potential invasiveness of these measures has 
led to concerns being expressed about the required standard of proof. For both asset freezes 
and proscriptions the standard of proof that applies is that of reasonable belief.45 This was also 
the standard that applied to TPIMs when they were first introduced, which marked an increase 
from the reasonable suspicion threshold that applied to Control Orders. However, following 
the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (and in response to a recommendation of the then 
Independent Reviewer46), the Home Secretary may now only issue a TPIM notice if he is 
satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the individual is, or has been, involved in 
terrorism-related activity.47 This increase from the previous standard of reasonable belief is 
significant since the balance of probabilities is recognised in formal legal terms as the standard 
of proof in civil litigation and, from a theoretical point of view, the change represents a 
movement from an approach based on the judgment of the executive to one based on the 
establishment of facts.48 Whilst the practical impact of this change may be minimal,49 adopting 
an approach based on the establishment of facts does go some way towards increasing the 
legitimacy of the TPIMs regime.50 
This leads us to the second set of concerns, which focus on the roles of the executive and 
judiciary. There have been repeated suggestions that it should be the courts, not the executive, 
that issue TPIM notices.51 Those who argue that TPIM notices should be issued by the courts 
emphasise the impact of TPIMs on an individual’s liberty and the independence of the 
judiciary. Others assert that TPIMs are concerned primarily with national security, which is the 
responsibility of the executive, and emphasise that the Home Secretary is democratically 
accountable for the decisions he or she makes in this regard. The existing arrangement – in 
which the Home Secretary issues TPIM notices but only after first receiving the permission of 
the courts – is in effect an uneasy compromise between these perspectives. At the same time 
that he recommended increasing the standard of proof that applies to TPIMs to the civil 
standard, former Independent Reviewer David Anderson also recommended that the Home 
Secretary should be required, at a TPIM review hearing, to satisfy the court on the balance of 
probabilities that the person is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.52 But whilst 
this change was supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights,53 it was not accepted by 
the coalition government who reasserted that ‘the Home Secretary is best placed to make the 
decision to impose a TPIM notice’.54 
In respect of asset freezes and proscription, the courts’ role is more limited still. There is no 
judicial involvement in the process for designating a person under TAFA or the process for 
                                               
45 TAFA, s. 2(1)(a); TA 2000, s. 3(4) 
46 Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013, paras 6.16–6.18. 
47 TPIMA, s. 3(1). 
48 Adrian Hunt, ‘From Control Orders to TPIMs: Variations on a Number of Themes in British Legal 
Responses to Terrorism’ (2014) 62 Crime, Law and Social Change 289. 
49 In his final annual report on Control Orders, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
Lord Carlile stated that ‘most’ of the 48 individuals who received Control Orders between 2005 and 2011 would 
still have received one even if the standard of proof had been the civil standard instead of the lower threshold of 
reasonable suspicion (Lord Carlile of Berriew, Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to 
Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (The Stationery Office, 2011) para. 29). A similar 
conclusion was reached by David Anderson in respect of TPIMs (Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures in 2013, para. 6.17). 
50 Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2011, para. 4.60. 
51 Stuart Macdonald, ‘The Role of the Courts in Imposing Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures: Normative Duality and Legal Realism’ (2015) 9(2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 265. 
52 Anderson, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013, paras 6.16–6.18. 
53 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (Fifth 
Report of Session 2014–15, The Stationery Office, 2015) paras 4.11–414. 
54 HM Government, The Government Response to the Report by David Anderson Q.C. on Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2014 (Cm 9041, The Stationery Office, 2015). 
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renewing a designation.55 Instead, designated persons have a right of appeal to the High Court.56 
All new designations and renewals are also reviewed by the Asset-Freezing Review sub-Group 
(AFRG).57 According to David Anderson, this ‘has been effective in focusing minds on whether 
the statutory tests are still met, and in clearing out dead wood’.58 Similarly, in respect of 
proscription there is also no judicial involvement in the proscription process. As noted above, 
a proscribed organisation, or any person affected by the organisation’s proscription, may apply 
to the Home Secretary for the organisation to be de-proscribed.59 If this application is 
unsuccessful, there then exists a right of appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal 
Commission (POAC).60 Whilst section 5(3) of the TA 2000 states that the principles of judicial 
review apply at such a hearing, the Court of Appeal has insisted that POAC should apply an 
intense level of scrutiny to the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe.61 This mirrors the 
position in respect of TPIM review hearings (and, previously, Control Orders).62 In contrast to 
both asset freezes and TPIMs, however, there is no longer annual review of decisions to 
proscribe: the Home Secretary will consider de-proscription on application only.63 This is an 
‘unsatisfactory situation’ not merely because of the cost involved in applying for de-
proscription and the fact that proscription lasts indefinitely, but also because some currently 
proscribed organisations do not appear to meet the legal threshold for proscription since they 
cannot be said to be currently concerned in terrorism.64 Indeed, a few may be moribund or even 
obsolete. 
The third set of concerns regards the use of closed material proceedings. During both a TPIM 
review hearing and an appeal to POAC the court may exclude the individual and his legal 
representative from the proceedings if doing so is necessary to ensure that information is not 
disclosed contrary to the public interest.65 This must now be read in the light of the decision in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (hereafter ‘AF (No 3)’), in which the House 
of Lords held that the individual must ‘be given sufficient information about the allegations 
against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations’.66 The 
scope of this minimum disclosure requirement has been determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Whilst the terms of the Control Order in AF (No 3) involved significant restrictions on liberty, 
the High Court held that the minimum disclosure requirement also applied to light-touch 
Control Orders.67 It will presumably therefore be held to apply to all TPIM review hearings. 
The judgment in AF (No 3) thus alleviates some of the unease about the use of closed material 
proceedings in TPIM proceedings, though it remains to be seen whether it will also be held to 
apply to POAC proceedings and appeals against asset freezes. 
During closed sessions the individual is represented by a Special Advocate (a practitioner with 
security clearance appointed by the Attorney General).68 The Special Advocate may make 
                                               
55 For an overview of these processes, see David Anderson, Third Report on the Operation of the 
Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (The Stationery Office, 2013) paras 3.10, 3.13. 
56 TAFA, s. 26. 
57 This was introduced on the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer. See Anderson, Third Report 
on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (n 55) para. 3.4. 
58 Anderson, Fourth Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, para. 3.2. 
59 TA 2000, s. 4. 
60 Ibid. 2000, s. 5(2). 
61 Alton (n. 27). 
62 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140, [2007] QB 415. 
63 David Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2013: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (The Stationery Office, 2014) para. 5.8. 
64 David Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (The Stationery Office, 2015) paras 4.11–4.13. 
65 CPR 80.18(1); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 22(1). 
66 [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 AC 269, [59] (per Lord Phillips). 
67 Secretary of State for the Home Department v BC [2009] EWHC 2927 (Admin), [2010] 1 WLR 1542. 
68 CPR 80.19; Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 9(3). 
 submissions and cross-examine witnesses on behalf of the individual.69 A study of the relevant 
cases shows that judges have found the contribution of Special Advocates to be valuable and 
effective in the protection of the individuals whose interests they represent.70 Yet the Special 
Advocates themselves have expressed misgivings about their role. Before the Special Advocate 
is shown the closed materials he may communicate freely with the individual and the 
individual’s legal representative.71 Once the Special Advocate has been served with the closed 
materials, the individual may still communicate with him (in writing and through his legal 
representative).72 But the Special Advocate may no longer communicate with the individual, 
except in two circumstances: first, to acknowledge receipt (in writing) of any communication 
received from the individual;73 and, second, following a successful application to the court for 
authorisation to communicate with the individual or his legal representative.74 Before the court 
decides whether to grant authorisation, however, the Home Secretary must be notified of the 
request and given the opportunity to object.75 The effect of this, according to evidence provided 
to the Joint Committee on Human Rights by a group of Special Advocates, was that 
the facility in the Rules to seek the Court’s permission to consult with the controlled 
person was rarely used in practice, partly because such permission was unlikely to be 
forthcoming in practice if the purpose of the meeting was to discuss anything to do with 
the closed case, and partly because the Rules require any application for such 
permission to be served on the Secretary of State, which is not considered tactically 
desirable because of the risk that it might give away to the opposing party the parts of 
the closed evidence in relation to which the controlled person does not have an 
explanation.76 
Furthermore, even if permission was sought, ‘it would be very likely to be refused because any 
question that it would assist the Special Advocates to ask is likely to be one from which part 
of the closed case could be inferred’.77 It is this restriction on the ability to communicate with 
the individual that the Special Advocates themselves have described as ‘the most significant 
restriction on the ability of [Special Advocates] to operate effectively’.78 This – in addition to 
other concerns including lack of funding and access to justice, the lack of any practical ability 
to call evidence and the practice of iterative disclosure – led a group of 57 Special Advocates 
to state that closed materials proceedings ‘are inherently unfair; they do not “work effectively”, 
nor do they deliver real procedural fairness’.79 Yet, following the Justice and Security Act 2013, 
closed material proceedings may now be employed not only in appeals under TAFA as well as 
POAC proceedings and TPIM review hearings, but in all civil proceedings. 
The final set of concerns regards the proximity of the suspect to an actual act of terrorism. In 
his report on the operation of TPIMs during 2013, David Anderson drew attention to the fact 
that the definition of terrorism-related activity in TPIMA was broader than the one in TAFA, 
and questioned 
                                               
69 CPR 80.20; Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r.  9(5). 
70 This is based on an examination of the relevant case files by one of the current co-authors (Lord 
Carlile). 
71 CPR 80.21(1); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 10(1). 
72 CPR 80.21(6)(a); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 10(6)(a). 
73 CPR 80.21(6)(b); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 10(6)(b). 
74 CPR 80.21(4); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 10(4). 
75 CPR 80.21(5); Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, r. 10(5). 
76 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 Days, Intercept 
and Post-Charge Questioning (19th Report of Session 2006–07, The Stationery Office, 2007) para. 201. 
77 Martin Chamberlain, ‘Special Advocates and Procedural Fairness in Closed Proceedings’ (2009) 28(3) 
Civil Justice Quarterly 314, 322. 
78 Justice and Security Green Paper: Response to Consultation from Special Advocates (2011) para. 27. 
79 Ibid. para. 15. 
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whether measures as strong as TPIMs need or ought to be available for use against a 
person whose connection with an act of terrorism could be as remote as the giving of 
support to someone who gives encouragement to someone who prepares an act of 
terrorism. That person is at three removes from terrorism – itself a concept that 
encompasses more than just politically-motivated violent acts.80 
Whilst noting that TPIMs had not to that point been sought against ‘peripheral figures’, he 
pointed out that there might be a ‘temptation to resort to the outer fringes of the [definition]’, 
particularly in a case in which evidence of new terrorism-related activity needs to be found in 
order to justify issuing a new TPIM notice.81 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
accordingly narrowed the scope of the definition. The revised definition now encompasses: the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; conduct that facilitates the 
commission, preparation or instigation of such acts (or that is intended to do so); conduct that 
gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts (or that is 
intended to do so); and conduct that gives support or assistance to those who are known or 
believed by the suspect to be involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism.82 Some differences between TPIMA’s revised definition of terrorism-related activity 
and the one used in TAFA do remain; in particular, the TAFA definition is still capable of 
encompassing individuals who are three steps removed from terrorist acts – such as someone 
[D1] who lends support to someone else [D2] who facilitates the instigation [by D3] of a 
terrorist act to be committed by someone else [D4].83 A further difference is that TAFA’s 
definition does not encompass conduct that gives encouragement to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of terrorist acts. 
In contrast to both TPIMA and TAFA, the TA 2000 does not use the term terrorism-related 
activity. As explained above, it instead states that an organisation may be proscribed if it is 
‘concerned in terrorism’.84 The definition of this term encompasses organisations that are 
committing, participating in, preparing for or are otherwise (actively) concerned in terrorism.85 
It also encompasses organisations that are promoting or encouraging terrorism, that is are one 
step removed from terrorist acts.86 But, whilst it does not extend to organisations that are two 
or more steps removed, it is expansive in a different sense. Unlike TPIMA, the TA 2000’s 
definition of encouragement mirrors the one used in the encouragement of terrorism offence,87 
and so includes the glorification of (past, present or future) terrorist acts.88 As will be explained 
further below, the encouragement of terrorism offence has been criticised.89 The nebulosity of 
the concept of glorification in particular gives both the encouragement of terrorism offence and 
the preconditions for proscription an uncertain and over-inclusive ambit. 
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 Disruption by prosecution: terrorism precursor offences 
The criminal law has a preventative, as well as a punitive, function.90 As Husak states, ‘Statutes 
designed to prevent future harm are neither unusual nor deviant’.91 In addition to the well-
known inchoate offences of attempt,92 conspiracy93 and encouraging/assisting crime,94 there are 
a number of offences that penalise conduct that creates a risk of harm (such as speeding, drunk-
driving and dangerous driving) as well as what Ashworth and Zedner describe as ‘substantive 
offences defined in the inchoate mode’.95 Alongside these offences there exist a number of pre-
inchoate – or precursor – offences. In the specific context of terrorism-related activity, the 
rationale of these precursor offences is twofold. The first is evidentiary. Offences such as 
conspiracy and encouraging crime are notoriously difficult to prove. Many terrorist groups 
observe good communications security, such that ‘Clear, understandable exchanges that plainly 
inculpate those involved are very much the exception’.96 And even if materials that have 
evidential value are available, there may be public interest reasons for not disclosing them in 
open court (such as not exposing other ongoing investigations or revealing agencies’ 
capabilities97) and/or the UK’s self-imposed ban on the use of intercept as evidence in criminal 
trials may apply.98 The second reason is temporal. The offence of attempt only applies if the 
defendant has performed an act that is ‘more than merely preparatory’ to commission of the 
planned full offence.99 This test has been interpreted to mean that the defendant is not guilty of 
a criminal attempt until he ‘embarks upon the crime proper’.100 When responding to would-be 
terrorists, this is regarded as leaving it too late. It is necessary to intervene at an earlier stage: 
in the words of David Anderson, it is necessary to defend further up the field.101 
There are a large number of different terrorism precursor offences, found predominantly in the 
2000 and 2006 Terrorism Acts. These include: membership of a proscribed organisation;102 
inviting support for a proscribed organisation;103 wearing the uniform of a proscribed 
organisation;104 fund-raising for terrorist purposes;105 use or possession of money or other 
property for terrorist purposes;106 failure to disclose information which might be of material 
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assistance in preventing a terrorist act;107 directing the activities of a terrorist organisation;108 
possession of an article for terrorist purposes;109 collection of information or possession of a 
document likely to be useful to a terrorist;110 encouragement of terrorism;111 dissemination of 
terrorist publications;112 preparation of terrorist acts;113 training for terrorism;114 and attendance 
at a place used for terrorist training.115 A number of criticisms have been levelled at this wide 
range of offences, including: their often broad and ambiguous wording; the potential they 
create for intrusive and discriminatory methods of investigation; the severity of the 
accompanying sentencing powers; the level of overlap between the offences and whether all 
the offences are actually necessary; and the lack of evidence to support the empirical 
assumption that the offences have a preventative effect.116 Our aim, however, is not to argue 
that terrorism precursor offences should be rejected. As explained above, this stratum of 
offences is necessary, though it is essential that its scope is carefully justified and 
circumscribed.117 Rather, our aim is to draw attention to the potentially self-defeating nature of 
terrorism precursor offences. This section will show that the criticisms of the non-criminal 
methods of disruption identified above – the very reasons why those methods are not the option 
of first resort – may also be applied to the terrorism precursor offences (as currently 
constituted). This inconsistency threatens to undermine both the rationale for prosecution as 
the measure of first resort and the moral authority and legitimacy of the criminal law. 
Whilst the criminal trial requires an individualised assessment of guilt, there are two respects 
in which terrorism precursor offences dilute the force of the requirement that the prosecution 
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. First, some of these offences are intertwined with 
other, non-criminal methods of disruption, resulting in a degree of hybridity. For example, the 
offences of belonging to a proscribed organisation and making funds available to a designated 
person might equally be expressed as belonging to an organisation that the Home Secretary 
reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism and providing funds to a person that the Home 
Secretary reasonably believes (a) has been involved in terrorist activity, and (b) is someone 
against whom the public requires protection.118 The civil law underpinning of these offences 
effectively means that some of the preconditions for a finding of criminal liability do not have 
to be established to the criminal standard. A similar point applies to the offence of breaching a 
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 TPIM notice.119 Here the focus of the criminal trial will be whether it has been proven, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant violated his TPIM notice without reasonable excuse. The 
question whether the defendant is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, which the 
Home Secretary determined was proven to the civil standard as part of the process for imposing 
the TPIM notice, will not be revisited. This use of orders made in civil law proceedings to 
justify the subsequent imposition of severe criminal penalties – a technique that has been 
adopted in a number of contexts120 – led Ashworth to describe civil preventative orders like 
TPIMs as a ‘Trojan horse’.121 
Second, it is important to recognise that the content of substantive laws can undermine 
procedural rules in a more general sense.122 When an offence is defined in very expansive terms, 
the probative burden that rests on the prosecution is diminished. Indeed, the actus reus of a 
number of precursor offences is defined so broadly that proving this part of the offence will 
inevitably be straightforward. For example, for the offence of use or possession of money or 
other property for terrorist purposes all that is required to establish the actus reus is that the 
defendant possessed money or other property.123 Similarly, the actus reus of the offence of 
preparation of terrorist acts merely requires proof that the defendant engaged ‘in any 
conduct’.124 In these offences it is clear that the mens rea requirement will take centre stage – 
which gives rise not only to concerns about whether the mens rea of these offences is 
sufficiently stringent (whilst the latter offence requires proof of intention, the former requires 
only that the defendant had reasonable cause to suspect that the money/property may be used 
for the purposes of terrorism), but also the potentially invasive and discriminatory methods of 
investigation that might be employed in order to ascertain a defendant’s thoughts in the absence 
of any overtly incriminating acts. A further example of how the substance of a law might 
undermine procedural rules is the offence of collection of information or possession of a 
document likely to be useful to a terrorist.125 Even though the definition of this offence now 
has a narrower scope following the gloss added to it by the House of Lords in R v G,126 it 
remains unnecessary to prove that the defendant had any terrorist purpose or connection.127 The 
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt can have no bite if there is nothing to prove! 
The second and third set of concerns about the non-criminal methods of disruption examined 
above focused on the limited role of the judiciary and the possibility of closed proceedings. 
Similar concerns have also been expressed about terrorism precursor offences, notwithstanding 
the fact that the trial of a defendant charged with such an offence will be held in a criminal 
court, before an independent judge, with no possibility of closed proceedings. As we have seen, 
the definitions of these offences are frequently over-inclusive, such that there is a discrepancy 
between the definition itself and the wrong that is in fact being targeted. The offence of 
encouragement of terrorism, for example, was targeted at extremists who promote a culture of 
hate, but is broad enough to also encompass North Korean exiles who criticise their native 
regime and those ‘who express their ability to understand the actions of Palestinian suicide-
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bombers’.128 Moreover, terrorism precursor offences cannot be regarded as analogous to 
offences such as speeding or possession of weapons – i.e. offences of necessitous over-
inclusion – since unlike these offences precursor crimes do not seek to guide all citizens away 
from all of the conduct they encompass. Rather, only some of those who fall within the offence 
definition will be selected for prosecution. This selection will presumably be based largely on 
whether the individual in question is deemed to pose a threat to national security. But at trial 
the issue will be whether the requirements set out in the offence definition are satisfied. The 
national security considerations that led to the decision to prosecute will sit in the background. 
So ‘Even though the pursuit of security is central to the justification for the law itself, it is not 
open to challenge by the defendant with respect to his particular case’.129 For this reason 
Edwards labels the terrorism precursor offences ‘ouster offences’,130 since they deprive the trial 
court of the opportunity to adjudicate on the actions that the offences are targeting. 
Lastly, terrorism precursor offences may encompass peripheral figures who are several steps 
removed from acts of terrorism.131 Two features of these offences give them this expansive 
reach. First, a number of the precursor offences target not only would-be perpetrators of 
terrorists acts and accomplices who facilitate the acts of these would-be perpetrators. They also 
encompass those who facilitate the acts of accomplices. For example, the offence of 
encouragement of terrorism encompasses not only the individual (D1) who encourages another 
(D2) to commit an act of terrorism, but also the person (D1) who encourages another (D2) to 
instigate an act of terrorism to be committed by someone else (D3) and even the one (D1) who 
causes another (D2) to publish a statement that encourages another (D3) to instigate an act of 
terrorism to be committed by someone else (D4). So already the precursor offences may reach 
those who are up to three steps removed from an act of terrorism. Add to this the second feature, 
which is that many of the precursor offences can be committed in inchoate form (such as 
attempting to prepare an act of terrorism or conspiracy to provide training for terrorism) – and 
in some instances it may even be possible to place one layer of inchoate liability on top of 
another, so-called double inchoate liability – and at their most extreme the precursor offences 
may reach those up to five steps removed from a terrorist act!132 This gives them a significantly 
wider reach than the non-criminal methods of disruption outlined in the previous section. 
Conclusion 
The features of terrorism precursor offences that we have identified in this chapter create a 
danger of inappropriate convictions. Here, experience tells us that trial by jury is an important 
safeguard. For example, 29-year-old medical student Yousif Badri was found not guilty at 
Glasgow High Court of being involved in conduct with the intention of committing acts of 
terrorism. The case against him had been based on alleged contact with a terrorist organisation 
and possession of online materials and a tub of nails.133 Also, 27-year-old Erol Incedal was 
convicted of possession of a five-page bomb-making manual but acquitted (following a retrial) 
on the more serious charge of plotting to mount a Mumbai-style attack on the streets of 
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 London.134 And 18-year-old Waris Ali – who had been accused of possessing the Anarchists’ 
Cookbook and researching bomb-making techniques online in order to blow up members of the 
British National Party – was acquitted of possessing an article for a terrorist purpose.135 
Moreover, in more general terms, it has to be remembered that, whilst generally faithful to 
judicial directions of law, juries have been known to use their verdicts to reject what they 
perceive as unfairness.136 However, whilst the possibility of a jury returning a verdict of not 
guilty is a valuable safeguard, it is important to seek to ensure that those who are not guilty are 
not prosecuted wherever possible. 
There have also been cases in which the appeal courts have demonstrated restraint, by limiting 
the overly broad interpretation of terrorism offences.137 For example, the House of Lords used 
the interpretative obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 to hold that a defendant 
pleading the section 11(2) defence on a charge of being a member of a proscribed organisation 
bears an evidential, not a persuasive, burden.138 And in R v G the House of Lords narrowed the 
scope of the offence of collection of information or possession of a document likely to be useful 
to a terrorist, by refining the statute’s statement of the offence’s actus reus and reading into the 
offence two mens rea requirements (although the offence does still retain an overly broad 
ambit).139 Examples such as these underscore the importance of legislative restraint when new 
offences are created. In particular, a high level of culpability should be required for terrorism 
precursor offences.140 
Whilst offence definitions should be as clear and tightly drawn as possible, it is also important 
to recognise that it is not possible to neatly dichotomise rules and discretion. Discretion is 
heavily implicated in the interpretation and application of rules, and rules enter the exercise of 
discretion.141 Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere, some proposed rewordings of terrorism 
precursor offences would be open to more than one possible interpretation, meaning that they 
might not only fail to narrow the scope of the offence in question but would also involve a 
sacrifice of legal certainty.142 So in addition to encouraging greater legislative restraint, it is 
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also necessary to harness the restraining power of extra-legal constraints. In particular, the 
discretion not to prosecute – vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions or, in some instances, 
the Attorney General – is a significant procedural protection. Yet at present the exercise of this 
discretion in the context of terrorism precursor offences is both unpredictable and ill-defined. 
Guidance should be published that seeks not only to clarify the ambit of individual offences, 
but also explain how choices should be made between offences in situations where they overlap 
(especially given the important implications this may have in terms of the maximum applicable 
sentence). 
To conclude, this chapter has highlighted the tension between, on the one hand, the role that 
terrorism precursor offences play in disrupting terrorist activity and protecting the public and, 
on the other hand, the temptation to take disproportionate refuge in yet more broadly couched 
and ill-defined criminal offences. In seeking to resolve this tension, it is essential to be mindful 
of the reason why we prioritise prosecution in the first place and to endeavour to respect those 
features of the criminal law that give it its unique moral authority and legitimacy. 
